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## Introduction

### 1. Overview

In the very broadest terms, the goal of this project is to say something about the relationship between the logical and the non-logical in Hegel's mature system of philosophy. In textual terms, this means the relationship between the material presented in, on the one hand, the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopedia Logic*, and, on the other hand, the volumes on Nature and Spirit that comprise what is often referred to as Hegel's "Realphilosophie." In theoretical terms, this means the relationship between Hegel's account of form and the respective manifestations of that form in the physical and mental domains.

In order to even begin to approach this question, it is necessary to get clear on what the dualisms in question amount to for Hegel. Though it is readily apparent that there is *some* philosophically significant difference between the logical, formal topics discussed in the logical texts and the more concrete topics discussed in the Realphilosophie, there is disagreement amongst interpreters about what this difference consists in. This can be seen, for example, in the amount of ink that has been spilled in discussions about the poorly understood "transition" from Logic to Nature in Hegel's Encyclopedia.<sup>1</sup> It can also be seen in the lack of scholarly consensus about whether or not Hegel is faithful to the Kantian distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, and, pursuantly, whether or not these categories adequately capture the distinction between Hegel's logical and non-logical texts.<sup>2</sup>

In this project, I take a new approach to understanding the systematic relationship of Hegel's Encyclopedic texts. My central interpretive wager is that Kant's Transcendental

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. e.g. Ferrini (1999), Houlgate (2005), Martin (forthcoming).

<sup>2</sup> This distinction is often taken on in the literature without being explicitly thematized, especially by readers wishing to emphasize the Kantian elements of Hegel's thought. On the other side of things, Rand (2006) is the most outspoken critic of applying the a priori/a posteriori distinction to Hegel (though other explicit versions of the position exist, such as the one described in Ng [2009]). For my part, I am sympathetic to the position that, in the final analysis, this distinction cannot properly be applied to Hegel without significant redefinition of the terms in question.

Aesthetic can be understood as providing a key to the architectonic of Hegel's mature system. Following through on this insight, I argue that a neglected theory of conceptual exhibition or *Darstellung* stands at the heart of Hegel's account of what it is for something to be intelligible—and, thus, to be at all.<sup>3</sup>

Reading Hegel through the lens of Kant is obviously not in and of itself a new approach. In the contemporary context, Hegel's Kantian inheritance has been investigated in a number of important scholarly contributions. Foremost among these is Robert Pippin's pathbreaking 1989 book, *Hegel's Idealism*. Others working in this vein include Beatrice Longuenesse, Terry Pinkard, and Sally Sedgwick.<sup>4</sup> Thus far, Kantian readings of Hegel have largely been focused on Hegel's reception of Kant's accounts of the faculties of understanding and reason as these are laid out in the *Critique of Pure Reason's* Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic.<sup>5</sup> The novelty of my particular Kant-inflected reading of Hegel lies in my emphasis on the importance of the theory of sensibility that Kant offers in the first *Critique's* Transcendental Aesthetic for understanding Hegel's philosophical project.

At first blush, this can seem to be a singularly unpromising angle of approach to interpreting Hegel due to Hegel's frequently evidenced lack of regard for Kant's theory of sensibility. In the *Science of Logic*, for example, Hegel famously goes out of his way to indict the Transcendental Aesthetic as being a pernicious symptom of the "psychologism" of Kant's theoretical philosophy. In Hegel's terms, this accusation amounts to a rejection of Kant's claim that the set of knowable worldly objects is only a set of knowable worldly objects *for us*—that is, for rational thinkers whose sensory faculties are configured in the way that ours are. One of Hegel's central interests in his own theoretical philosophy is to go beyond Kant by giving an

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<sup>3</sup> Theunissen (1980) also emphasizes the importance of *Darstellung* to Hegel's *Science of Logic*, though his interest lies more in the role of this function in Hegel's Objective Logic.

<sup>4</sup> Longuenesse (2007), Pinkard (1994), Pippin (1989) and (2018), Sedgwick (2012).

<sup>5</sup> Kreines (2015) has given the most full-fledged treatment of the specific importance of the Transcendental Dialectic for Hegel's theoretical philosophy.

account of what knowable objects are like on their own, prior to any mental contribution from finite rational cognition. Critiquing Kant on this score, Hegel writes things like:

...the Kantian philosophy has never gotten over the psychological reflex of the concept and has once more reverted to the claim that the concept is permanently conditioned by the manifold of intuition.<sup>6</sup>

“Manifold of intuition” refers to the cognitive contribution made by sensibility in Kant’s scheme. In the *Encyclopedia Logic* and the *Philosophy of Spirit*, the psychological limitations of Kant’s brand of idealism in general and of his Aesthetic in particular are expounded on in greater detail.<sup>7</sup>

As I read Hegel, however, the criticisms being levelled at Kant in passages like these are not intended as wholesale rejections of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Rather, I take Hegel’s criticism to be more nuanced. On the view that I defend throughout the dissertation, Hegel holds that Kant has conflated three properly distinct philosophical topics in the Transcendental Aesthetic. These are: (i) space and time as formal determinations of physical objects; (ii) the set of subjective psychological cognitive acts such as sensing, perceiving, and intuiting performed by embodied rational cognizers, and (iii) the logical function of exhibition [in German: *Darstellung*; in Kant’s Latin: *hypotyposis*] by means of which the actuality of concepts—that is, their instantiation in an object or set of objects that fall under them—is demonstrated (this last is obviously the most obscure from the point of view of contemporary philosophy; I return to it in detail below). On my reading, the complaint being brought against the Kantian Aesthetic in the *Science of Logic* is motivated by Hegel’s rejection of the logical relevance of (i) and (ii). I argue, however, that Hegel endorses the logical relevance of (iii) and, in fact, places a theory of conceptual exhibition at the center of his discussion of “Subjectivity” in the final book of the

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<sup>6</sup> SL 520, 12.22-3.

<sup>7</sup> EL 83-6, §42 and 88, §45Z.

*Science of Logic*. His goal in doing so is to offer a new theory of sensible appearances by replacing Kant's subject-involving theory of representation [*Vorstellung*] with an objective theory of exhibition [*Darstellung*]. The prefixes to the German words track the distinction: whereas in the Kantian picture, the knowing subject sets up representations of objects as they appear *before* her, Hegel's goal is to account for how objects can be understood simply as they appear *there* in the world.

On Hegel's reading of Kant, there are already resources available in Kant's own thought for effecting this shift. I focus on Hegel's transformation of two related Kantian topics: first, Hegel's rejection of Kant's categories or pure concepts of the understanding in favor of a different class of concepts that Kant calls the ideas of pure reason, and, second, Hegel's rejection of the class of pure intuitions that Kant terms "schematic" in favor of a different class of intuitions that Kant terms "symbolic." I subsequently show how, once this new framework is established in the *Science of Logic*, the physical role of space and time is treated in the *Philosophy of Nature*, and the cognitive aspect of sensing is treated in the *Philosophy of Spirit*.

## **2. Contextualizing the Project**

The centerpiece of my argument is a novel reading of the account of apperception that Hegel describes in the *Science of Logic*. The stakes of such a reading are best understood in relation to three points of contention that have shaped recent debates in Hegel scholarship. These are:

- (i) the debate about whether Hegel is properly understood as a "metaphysics-first" or "epistemology-first" thinker and the attendant question about the efficacy of a Kantian approach to Hegel's thought;

(ii) a further question amongst interpreters who decide in favor of the Kantian approach about precisely how Hegel's inheritance of Kantian apperception is best understood;

(iii) a final point about which specific portions of the *Science of Logic* should take interpretive precedence.

In what follows, I adopt language employed by James Kreines to clarify the stakes of (i), and to describe my own project as a “meaning-first” reading of Hegel that foregrounds Hegel's Kantian inheritance. I then move on to (ii) and consider the respective interpretations of Hegelian apperception defended by Robert Pippin and Beatrice Longuenesse. I show how my own view combines elements from both of these readings. Finally, I discuss my emphasis on the exegetical importance of the “Subjectivity” section of the Logic of the Concept against a recent tendency in the literature to focus on the discussions of teleology and life.

### **(i) Metaphysics-first vs. Epistemology-first Readings**

In spite of the generally acknowledged inadequacy of a flat-footed inquiry into whether Hegel's theoretical philosophy is best understood as being “metaphysical” or “non-metaphysical,” the debate about this topic persists in the literature.<sup>8</sup> Framed in a simplistic, either/or way, there can be only one answer to this question: namely, that Hegel's thought is *in some way* metaphysical. Behind the crucial phrase “in some way” stands a host of genuine substantive debates about what precisely Hegel's metaphysical views are, how he argues for these views, and which elements of his thought are evidence for them. There is also a distinct but closely related question about whether Hegel's philosophical system is best understood as an inheritor of Kant's

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<sup>8</sup> See e.g. Bowman (2013), de Laurentiis (2016), Stern (2009).

thought or of Spinoza's thought—Spinoza here being understood as a representative of the pre-Kantian rationalist metaphysical tradition and Kant as the proponent of a largely anti-metaphysical epistemological position.

As James Kreines has argued, a reframing of this debate that brings out the substantive issues lying behind the flat-footed version of the inquiry is needed.<sup>9</sup> In his recent book on Hegel, Kreines proposes that one such substantive issue is that of what the “organizing focus” of Hegel's philosophy is. He suggests that Hegel interpretations can be distinguished according to whether they understand Hegel's thought as having a “metaphysics-first” or an “epistemology-first” organizing focus.<sup>10</sup> On this view, metaphysics-first readings will foreground Hegel's interest in “philosophical inquiry into explanatory reasons, or reasons in the world, and ultimately into their completeness.”<sup>11</sup> Epistemology-first readings, by contrast, will develop around issues of justification and knowledge, with an eye to combatting attendant skeptical worries.

Each of these sorts of readings can be aligned with a distinct view about how Hegel fits in the history of philosophy. For the metaphysics-first reader, Hegel is the inheritor of the kinds of questions about sufficient reason and grounding that concerned rationalist metaphysicians like Leibniz and Spinoza. For the epistemology-first reader, Hegel is instead heir to the anti-skeptical aspect of Kant's project.

As Kreines notes, metaphysics and epistemology are not the only organizing foci that one might ascribe to Hegelian thought. One might also argue that semantics, in the very broad sense of the study of the theory of meaning or intentionality, is the central concern of Hegel's thought. Kreines ultimately folds such meaning-first readings in with epistemology-first ones, but I think this move is overhasty.<sup>12</sup> It seems to me that a set of issues about meaning is, in fact, the

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<sup>9</sup> Kreines (2006).

<sup>10</sup> Kreines (2015) 7-15.

<sup>11</sup> Kreines (2015) 9.

<sup>12</sup> The failure to distinguish robustly between epistemology-first and meaning-first readings is, in my opinion, one of the primary reasons that Kantian readings (such as Robert Pippin's) have been misunderstood in the literature.

central concern of Hegel's theoretical philosophy. These issues are the orienting focus of my own reading of Hegel.

What does it mean to say that Hegel's thought is centrally concerned with meaning or intentionality? To my mind, this means demonstrating that Hegel's primary interest in his theoretical philosophy is neither to offer explanatory reasons for phenomena nor to offer an account of the conditions of possibility of knowledge; rather it is to investigate the more primary issue of why there can be any such thing as either explanation or knowledge in the first place. Towards this end, Hegel's fundamental interest in the *Science of Logic* is to show that thinking and being are not dualistically separated off from one another, but, rather, that they somehow belong to one another and come along together. Thinking appears in the physical world and the physical world appears in thought, and the job of Hegelian philosophy is to explain why both of these things are necessary rather than scandalous.<sup>13</sup> As I read him, Hegel sets about this task by attempting to show that thinking is definitionally 'about' or 'directed at' being and being is definitionally 'about' or 'directed at' thinking.<sup>14</sup> In these terms, the relationship of thought and being is an intentional relationship. Furthermore, it is also a referential relationship, in the semantic sense, insofar as these terms are meaningful precisely insofar as they refer to one another. I take the exploration of the formal character of this intentional, referential relationship to be the central topic of Hegel's theoretical philosophy.

It is in this context that both the idea of conceptual exhibition [*Darstellung*] and Hegel's inheritance of the aesthetic elements of the Kantian project become relevant. In the Kantian picture, exhibition is the term that describes the demonstration of the sensible existence of a

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<sup>13</sup> Thinking and being are not equivalent to subject and object in the Hegelian picture. Hegel takes himself to have done away with the subject/object dichotomy in the *Phenomenology*. Even so, in the *Logic*, the being/essence distinction that is central to the Objective Logic is a sort of successor problem about the relationship of 'inner' and 'outer' that is philosophically fundamental for Hegel in a way that the subject/object divide is not. Thus, thinking and being are best understood here as mapping onto essence and being, rather than onto subject and object.

<sup>14</sup> It may seem odd to talk about being as having the sort of intentionality that thought has, but Hegel is clear that, in his picture, being and thought are both rational. I take this to license the inference that, if intentionality is a constitutive aspect of rational thinking, it must also be a constitutive aspect of rational being. The Heideggerian idea of truth as an act of "unconcealment" [*Unverborgenheit*] performed by being offers a parallel.

thought (in Kant's terms, a concept). Kant describes exhibition as the process by means of which "conceptual reality" is "established" via the linking up of a concept with a sensible appearance—that is, the linking up of a general representation to a singular existent.<sup>15</sup> Kant also describes exhibition as the "making sensible" of concepts.<sup>16</sup> Importantly, for Kant, this process always has an epistemic element: in the Kantian picture, the demonstration of the being of a thought is always the demonstration of the being of a thought *to* a finite rational cognizer.

The specific stakes of establishing conceptual reality are modal: an undemonstrated concept is a merely thinkable representation (what Kant calls an "idea" [*Idee*]) that is only *possible*, whereas a demonstrated concept is a knowable representation that is *actual*. In Kant's epistemic picture, modality is a function of cognition. In the first *Critique*, Kant describes a set of modal categories—possibility, actuality, and necessity—that index the relationship between the knowing subject and the objects of her knowledge. In this scheme, conceptual exhibition marks the specific cognitive difference between the categories of possibility and actuality.

Different sorts of concepts require different sorts of exhibitions. In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant illustrates the process of exhibition for empirical concepts using the striking example of an anatomist who, having described a human eye, goes on to exhibit the eye by means of performing a dissection: "if an anatomist has set forth the concept of the human eye discursively and goes on to dissect the eye to make the concept intuitable, we say that he demonstrates this organ."<sup>17</sup> In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the Schematism chapter describes the demonstration of the pure concepts of the understanding by means of the forms of intuition. In sum, Kantian conceptual exhibition has two main components: (i) exhibition establishes conceptual reality and (ii) it does so by forging a link between conceptual thought and the sensible existents that are available for perception by finite rational cognizers.

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<sup>15</sup> CJ §59 225.

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.* 226.

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.* §57 216.

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel remains concerned with both of these issues. He is interested to establish the reality of what he calls “the Concept” and, with a critical reservation, he is also interested in the way sensible appearance is required for establishing the Concept’s reality.<sup>18</sup> The critical reservation in question is the one I have already touched on above: unlike Kant, Hegel is not only interested in how conceptuality appears *to* finite rational cognizers. Rather, Hegel is interested in how conceptuality becomes sensible *in general*, apart from any psychological contributions made by the sensoria of finite perceivers. Put slightly otherwise: while Hegel takes himself to have shown in the *Phenomenology* that there is no need for a “transcendental deduction” that proves the commensurability of the supersensible and the sensible, this does not mean that he has nothing to say about how the formal relationship between these two elements plays out.

For Hegel, conceptual exhibition is no longer a narrowly epistemic process. Even so, on my reading, exhibition continues to be an apt description of the relationship between thinking and being as Hegel construes it. This is so specifically insofar as Hegelian thought and being can only be understood by the fact of their reference to one another. One of the central goals of my project is to reconstruct Hegel’s account of this reciprocal reference between thought and being.

It may seem paradoxical to discuss the topic of perception while excluding the involvement of any actual perceivers. It is helpful in this connection to remember that, prior to Kant, Western philosophy had a robust notion of divine mindedness that, often, served as the paradigm case of rational mindedness. It was this notion that allowed Isaac Newton to describe space as the sensorium of God, a remark that Hegel cites with approval in his *Philosophy of Nature*.<sup>19</sup> Unlike for finite perception, the sensible dimension of infinite perception is definitionally objective—that is, it describes a set of sensible appearances that are binding for all

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<sup>18</sup> These are two of the central issues at stake in the *Science of Logic*’s middle book, The Doctrine of Essence. As is well known, Hegel has a different, more demanding definition of what a concept is than Kant does. Even so, there is continuity between Hegel and Kant insofar as they both use “concept” as a term for describing a rule for unification. The point of contention is downstream, regarding what sorts of things properly count as rules of this kind.

<sup>19</sup> PN §261Z.

perceivers insofar as they perceive, in the same way that the laws of logic are binding for all thinkers insofar as they think.

I take this notion of the objectively sensible as the physical compliment to a conception of infinite rational mindedness to be what Hegel has in mind in his theoretical works. Hegel finds no philosophical interest in the theological implications of the notion of a divine subject, but he *is* interested in the logical-formal model of the relationship between thought and reality that emerges out of this notion. His particular interest has to do with the way in which infinite rational thought stands in a different relationship to its object than finite rational thought does: infinite rational mindedness *gives itself* an object, whereas finite rational mindedness is *given* an object. On my reading, it is precisely this activity of giving oneself an object that Hegel is after—that is, the idea that thought gives itself being, makes itself objective, or, synonymously, displays itself in a sensible form as an object.<sup>20</sup> At the same time, on Hegel’s view, the perceptually available world is made into a display of the form of thought, and, as such, offers a sensible point of contact with this ostensibly supersensible form. And all this in the absence of any specific minded being (human or divine) “doing” the thinking.

Thus, on Hegel’s view as I reconstruct it, conceptual thought is self-intentional, or, as he puts it in the *Science of Logic*, conceptuality gives itself reality.<sup>21</sup> He glosses this self-given reality as a conceptual “content” that is “posited by the form [of conceptuality] itself.”<sup>22</sup> Hegel further argues that a self-directed account of conceptual form along these lines is already contained in Kant’s own thought. Specifically, Hegel finds such an account in Kant’s description of the transcendental unity of apperception, which Hegel pursuantly places at the center of his own theory of conceptuality.

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<sup>20</sup> As with the eye, the thing displayed is transformed by this process: rather than simply being a sensible individual, it is made into a sensible universal or a “model” of the universal. I’m grateful to David Wellbery for pointing this out.

<sup>21</sup> SL 12.21, 518.

<sup>22</sup> SL 12.25, 523.

## (ii) Hegelian Apperception and Judgment

Allowing that apperception plays a central philosophical role for Hegel's understanding of logical form, the crucial question that must be asked is: *what* role? That is, what exactly does Hegel want from Kant's theory apperception?

The most famous and thoroughly explored answer to this question in the contemporary literature on Hegel is Robert Pippin's claim that what Hegel takes on from Kant's account of apperceptive synthesis is a certain notion of self-consciousness. In his most recent major work on Hegel, Pippin puts the point thus: "[Hegel's] Concept just is thought's self-consciousness of itself in thinking."<sup>23</sup> For Pippin, the paradigm case of such thinking is judging. It should be spelled out that Pippin's focus on thinking as judgment is concomitant with his view that Hegelian thought is fundamentally "discursive." He states, "Hegel decisively sides with Kant's view that thinking is discursive"<sup>24</sup> and he glosses discursivity to mean "to think what is the case is to assert that it is (the basic unit of intelligibility in Hegel's account is the judgment; assertion its linguistic manifestation)."<sup>25</sup> Thus, self-consciousness is the sort of self-consciousness that belongs to the discursively judging subject. In Pippin's words:

The claim common to Kant and Hegel is that judging is apperceptive, and that this is a logical matter, a matter of the very concept of judging, and this because no act of judging, asserting to be the case, say, could be such an act if the subjective judging were not self-consciously judging.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Pippin (2018) 106.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 113.

The kind of self-consciousness under discussion here is to be understood in a very specific, technical sense. It is emphatically not merely an introspective, psychological awareness of one's own "states of mind." Rather, it is a formal characteristic of the sort of first-personal thinking engaged in by a rational being. Pippin writes:

...to judge is to be aware not only of *what* one is judging, but that one is judging, asserting, claiming something. But one is not, cannot be, simultaneously judging that one is judging...Rather, judgment *is* the consciousness of judging. These are not two acts, but one.<sup>27</sup>

Thus, for Pippin, Hegel's commitment to apperception is a commitment to this formal notion of self-conscious discursive thinking.

I take it to be undeniable that, at many places in his oeuvre, Hegel hews to a theory of rational self-consciousness along these lines.<sup>28</sup> Even so, it is debatable whether or not this is the appropriate lens through which to understand Hegel's specific inheritance of Kantian apperception. In particular, Pippin's claim that "the Concept just is thought's self-consciousness of itself in thinking" has been contested by other Kant-inclined readers of Hegel's *Science of Logic*.

In the course of her *Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics*, for example, Beatrice Longuenesse defends an exemplary version of a very different position.<sup>29</sup> She argues that Hegelian apperception is fundamentally different in kind from Kantian apperception, and, further, that this difference has specifically to do with the kind of mindedness that each thinker is respectively interested in placing at the center of his account. She writes:

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<sup>27</sup> *ibid.* 105. Pippin goes on to draw on work by Sebastian Rödl to help make this point.

<sup>28</sup> Throughout the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, for example, as well as in the *Philosophy of Spirit* and the related lectures on Right, Aesthetics, and Religion.

<sup>29</sup> Horstmann (2006) defends a similar position to Longuenesse.

Kant and Hegel disagree in their answer to the question: what is the unity of apperception? For Kant, it is the unity of a finite consciousness: a consciousness which is not the source of its own empirical objects, but merely generates the forms according to which these objects are perceived and conceptualized...For Hegel, the unity of apperception is much more than this. It is the same “reason,” or intuitive understanding, which Hegel found in Kant’s [*Critique of Judgment*].<sup>30</sup>

For Longuenesse, Hegel’s interest in the account of apperception in the *Science of Logic* is to give an account of the kind of thinking enacted by an “intuitive understanding” rather than by a self-conscious discursive judge. On her reading, the “intuitive understanding” is a kind of mind—like a divine mind—that can spontaneously generate its own objects.<sup>31</sup>

On this reading, Hegel’s interest in apperception has little to do with the Kantian notion of self-consciousness. Rather, Hegel’s interest in apperception is primarily in the formal notion of synthetic unification that it delivers. In Longuenesse’s words:

Hegel’s concept, like Kant’s concepts, has a unifying function...the unifying function is itself subject; it does not have to be placed in a subject, be it even a “transcendental” subject. It is subject, i.e. it is what is active in the constitution of cognitions, and more generally in all thought process... What remains essential, then, is the fact that both Hegel and Kant characterize the concept as having a unifying function.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Longuenesse (2007) 187.

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.* 170. Cf. 187: “to interpret the transcendental unity of apperception in these terms [as Hegel does E.L.] is to say that it is the source not only of the form but also of the matter of appearances. It is to say that it is that unity of an understanding for which there is no distinction between form and matter, between possible and actual, between concept and intuition, the very understanding which in the third *Critique* Kant characterized as intuitive understanding.”

<sup>32</sup> *ibid.* 20

Thus, on Longuenesse's view, Hegel uses Kant's notion of apperception as a way of explaining the kind of activity that is the definitive activity of a divine subject. Here, "apperceptive" simply means the unifying function of the concept, i.e. of the intuitive understanding.

I think there is much to praise in Longuenesse's reading. In particular, I concur with her defense of the continuity between Hegel's arguments in *Faith and Knowledge* and his later arguments in the *Science of Logic*.<sup>33</sup> I also think she is right, *pace* Pippin, that Hegel's primary interest in Kantian apperception in the *Logic* is in the notion of formal unity that this logical structure provides rather than in a full-fledged notion of discursive self-consciousness thought.

At the same time, I reject Longuenesse's claim that Hegelian conceptual activity is the activity of an intuitive understanding. I side, nominally, with Pippin in holding that Hegelian conceptual activity is discursive. On this score, I follow Pippin as far as the claim that the discursivity of Hegelian thought is fundamentally bound up with the activity of judgment. On my reading, however, judgment is not a mental activity performed by a self-conscious thinker. I follow Hegel's lead in passages like this one: "The judgment is usually taken in a subjective sense, as an operation and a form, which occurs only in thinking that is conscious of itself. But this distinction is not yet present in the logical [realm]."<sup>34</sup> He continues on to say "every thing is a judgment [*alle Dinge sind ein Urteil*]."<sup>35</sup> I interpret this to mean that judgment is, first and foremost, a formal structure that characterizes any Hegelian individual (mental or physical).<sup>36</sup>

Further, judgment is primarily defined by its status as an act of division or diairesis, rather than as an act of combination or synthesis. I take it that this means that judgment is not, as Pippin would have it, "the primary unity of intelligibility" but, rather, only one of two

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<sup>33</sup> Pippin (1989) 66-73 also draws attention to the importance of this text as an early formulation of Hegel's view, though he does not defend the strong continuity that Longuenesse does.

<sup>34</sup> EL §167, 245.

<sup>35</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> Pippin (2018) acknowledges this. It is not clear to me, however, how the ascription of judgmental form to physical objects can ultimately be squared with his understanding of judgment as a paradigmatically self-conscious activity in the sense I have just described.

ingredients required for intelligibility.<sup>37</sup> The other of these ingredients is conceptuality itself, i.e. the moment of synthesis that compliments the dividing moment of judgment.<sup>38</sup>

### (iii) Subjectivity

The final issue of textual interpretation that I will say something about here has to do with the specific sections of Hegel's text around which I center my reading. Anyone aiming to distill a set of clear theses from Hegel's sprawling philosophical edifice finds herself in the position of picking and choosing which elements of Hegel's project to emphasize and which to leave behind for others. My reading foregrounds the set of post-Kantian aesthetic themes that I see at work throughout Hegel's Encyclopedia. In light of this, I focus primarily on reconstructing Hegel's obscure account of synthetic unity as it is first described in his early essay, *Faith and Knowledge*, and, later, in the "Subjectivity" section of the Concept Logic. My goal in doing so is to track Hegel's transformation of Kant's theory of intuition and the attendant issue of conceptual content. I then go on to link this discussion up with the related treatments of space and time in the *Philosophy of Nature* and of finite perception in the *Philosophy of Spirit*.

I take this approach in part because I think these segments of Hegel's work, and especially the "Subjectivity" section of the Logic, have received less attention than they merit. One reason why this is so is simply because it is particularly difficult to understand what Hegel is up to here. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the topics under discussion, i.e. the forms of judgment and inference, can seem at first blush to be much *less* exotic than some of the other topics treated in the *Science of Logic*. It is the very familiarity of the subject matter that makes Hegel's repurposing of it so challenging to pin down.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Pippin (2018) 99.

<sup>38</sup> SL 12.55, 552.

<sup>39</sup> Consequently, readings of this section of the *Logic* tend to be thin exegetical reconstructions. Exceptions can be found in Schick (2002) and Redding (2007).

In light of this, it is perhaps not surprising that recent literature on Hegel's theoretical philosophy has tended to focus heavily on the "Objectivity" and "Idea" sections of the *Concept Logic*. This is owing to a trending emphasis on the "vitalist" strand of thinking in Hegelian logic. Interpreters working in this vein have stressed the particular importance of the topics of teleology and life to Hegel's thought.<sup>40</sup> An adjacent trend is the attribution to Hegel of some species of neo-Aristotelian naturalism.<sup>41</sup>

It is undeniable that these vitalist topics are of interest to Hegel and that Hegel's views about them should, in turn, be of interest to contemporary philosophy (wherein such topics are only beginning to get a fair hearing). At the same time, overemphasizing the importance of these topics runs the risk of covering over aspects of Hegel's thought that are less easily motivated, but equally central. This is borne out in the way in which readings along these lines frequently gloss over or misconstrue the details of Hegel's account of apperception in "Subjectivity."<sup>42</sup>

This section, which begins with Hegel's account of "the Concept" and ends with his appeal to the demonstration of the identity of thought and being offered by the ontological proof, is the denouement of the *Science of Logic*. It is the place where the motivating drama of the Objective Logic, the distinction between Being and Essence, is resolved. Apperception is the device that effects this resolution. It does so specifically insofar as it provides the logical resources for describing the structure of self-reference by means of which the Concept provides itself with content.<sup>43</sup>

One of the primary goals of the reading that I advance is to make sense of the way in which the Concept employs self-referentiality in order to provide itself with content. Towards this end, I contend that the forms of judgment and inference are aesthetic forms for Hegel in the same way that space and time are aesthetic forms for Kant. Unlike for Kant, however, Hegel's

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<sup>40</sup> I have in mind especially the reading offered in Ng (2020), but see also Kreines (2008), Pinkard (2012), Pippin (2018) and Thompson (2012) and the collection of essays in Khurana (2013).

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Ferrarin (2007), McDowell (1996) and Pinkard (2012).

<sup>42</sup> I expand on this point in a pair of forthcoming reviews of Ng (2020) in the *SGIR Review* and *Hegel Bulletin*.

<sup>43</sup> Here I follow, again, Horstmann (2006) and Longuenesse (2005).

aesthetic forms are logically prior to the sensory capacities of finite rational perceivers. These forms are, instead, absolute forms of intelligibility that characterize anything that can rightfully be described as “being.”

Defending a position along these lines requires Hegel to propose a different account of apperceptive synthesis from the Kantian account. I suggest that Hegel draws on resources that he finds in Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* in order to do so. The lynchpin of my argument surrounding the *Science of Logic* is that Hegel’s conception of apperceptive synthesis is fundamentally symbolic.<sup>44</sup>

### 3. Symbolic Form

One of the central goals of my reading is to demonstrate the way in which Kantian and post-Kantian notions of “symbolic form” figure in Hegel’s logical project. Very generally, “symbolic form” describes a set of structural devices employed in both fine art and philosophy for making sense of the way in which one item can stand in for or refer to another item. On my reading, Hegel draws on this set of structural devices in order to offer a non-Kantian account of the synthetic unity of apperception.

The primary initial evidence in favor of this view is provided by Hegel in his 1802 “Faith and Knowledge” essay. I follow Beatrice Longuenesse and Sally Sedgwick in underscoring the continuity between this early essay and Hegel’s mature view.<sup>45</sup> My novel contribution to this line of interpretation is the claim that Hegel’s poorly understood praise of Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* in this text has specifically to do with Kant’s remarks about symbolic intuition in the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*.

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<sup>44</sup> There is a resonance here between my work on Hegel and recent work by Samantha Matherne on Kant defending the importance of symbolic intuition for Kant’s metaphysical thought. Cf. Matherne (2014), (2016) and a forthcoming contribution to the *Cambridge Critical Guide to the Prolegomena*.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Longuenesse (2005) and Sedgwick (2012).

I argue that Hegel's positive assessment of Kant's discussion of Aesthetic Judgment centers on a set of claims Kant makes about conceptual exhibition in *Critique of Judgment* §59 and the surrounding paragraphs. Up to this point in his critical philosophy, Kant has maintained that the reality of rational ideas is strictly indemonstrable. In these paragraphs, however, Kant indicates that a privative exhibition of these ideas can be provided by means of a procedure of judgment that he calls "symbolic intuition."

Kant's argument account of symbolic intuition is highly complex, but the key thought is that the relationship between two empirical concepts can illustrate the relationship between a rational idea and an empirical idea. Take, for example, the rational idea of "the soul." The soul is definitionally immaterial and, thus, we can never pick out any sensible objects that fall under this concept. But, according to Kant, the concept of the soul can be symbolically demonstrated by drawing an analogy between the way the soul acts on the body and an empirical relationship between terms—say, for example, a charioteer steering a team of horses. Kant claims that the relationship of charioteer to horses symbolizes the relationship of the soul to the body and, thus, allows for the indirect cognition of the soul.<sup>46</sup> The deficiencies of this procedure are readily apparent: there is no inherent connection between the symbol and the thing symbolized, and the aptness of the symbol is debatable. Even so, Kant argues that this sort of symbolic exhibition provides us some limited cognitive access to rational ideas.

In *Faith and Knowledge*, Hegel takes up this thought and runs with it. He is centrally interested in the possibility that the activity of one particular rational idea, the idea of freedom, can be symbolically exhibited by one particular aesthetic idea, the idea of the beautiful. Later, in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel will state that the rational concept is synonymous with freedom. More specifically, it is the free synthetic activity of reason, the Hegelian successor to Kantian

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<sup>46</sup> Kant is by no means the inventor of this sort of analogy. Though Kant does not explicitly note his sources, he could not have been unaware of the rich scholastic discussions of metaphysical and theological employments of analogy that can be traced back to Aristotle and commenters like Avicenna and Aquinas. Cf. Ashworth (1991) and (2014).

spontaneity. And, already in *Faith and Knowledge*, Hegel is interested in giving an account of how this sort of free conceptual activity appears in the sensible world. Put otherwise, he is interested in giving an account of the way that freedom appears.

The resources that Hegel finds in *Critique of Judgment's* account of symbolic intuitions allow him to begin to give such an account. But, as we have seen, in the Kantian picture, symbolic exhibitions of concepts are always privative. As in the case of the soul and the charioteer, the activity of freedom may be *likened to* the activity of beauty, but, on Kant's view, it is not one and the same activity.<sup>47</sup>

I argue that, in his quest to provide an account of how symbolic intuitions can be adequate to rational concepts, Hegel turns to Schelling's philosophy. My specific claim is that Hegel's specific version of symbolic form is best understood as an instance of something called "tautegorical symbolization." I borrow "tautegory" from Daniel Whistler's recent work on Schelling, but the coinage originates with English Romantic poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) who was active at the same time as Hegel. As Whistler shows, tautegorical symbolization was brought into philosophical usage by Schelling who was both a correspondent to Coleridge, and, more famously, a close friend and philosophical rival to Hegel.<sup>48</sup>

The description of a constellation of innovative theories of symbolic representation was one of the hallmarks of the European Romantic movement that arose at the turn of the nineteenth century.<sup>49</sup> In this context, Coleridge coined the neologism "tautegory" to describe one specific sort of symbolic representation. The term is formed from the Attic Greek roots "*tautos*" (meaning "identical") and "*agoreuein*" (meaning "to speak in the assembly").<sup>50</sup> Coleridge defined it to mean a symbol that "express[es] the *same* subject [as its referent] but with a *difference*."<sup>51</sup> The

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<sup>47</sup> Difficulties arise for Kant in relation to this particular claim because the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* seems to show, against the wishes of the author, that freedom and beauty are, in fact, one and the same activity. It is precisely this difficult that piques Hegel's interest.

<sup>48</sup> Whistler (2013).

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Halmi (2007) and Wellbery (1984).

<sup>50</sup> Halmi (2012) 354.

<sup>51</sup> Coleridge (1913) 136.

intended contrast is with “allegory,” from “*allos*” (other) and “*agoreuein*.” Regarding this distinction, Coleridge writes that, whereas an allegory is “but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language which is itself nothing but an abstraction,” a tautegory, by contrast, is a symbol which “always partakes of the reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative.”<sup>52</sup> Nicholas Halmi helpfully glosses this point thus: “whereas allegories merely substitute fictional images for abstract ideas, [tautegories] convey something beyond or greater than themselves precisely because of what they are in themselves.”<sup>53</sup> Another way of putting this point is to say that, whereas an allegory falls short of the thing it depicts, a tautegory is sufficient to the thing it depicts.

Schelling employs the notion of tautegory explicitly in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Mythology*, where he uses it to describe the unique mimetic nature of myth:

Everything in [myth] is...to be understood as mythology expresses it, not as if something else were thought, something else said. **Mythology is not allegorical; it is tautegorical.** To mythology the gods are actually existing essences, gods that are not something else, do not mean something else, but rather mean only what they are.<sup>54</sup>

The idea is that mythological symbols (such as the Greek gods) are not simply devices that stand in for something else (e.g. forces of nature or psychology). Schelling’s claim is, rather, that there is no different or better way to express what mythology expresses than through a set of stories about anthropomorphic deities. This stands in contrast to views that understand mythology as a set of “just so” stories that provide inadequate explanations for things that are best understood

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<sup>52</sup> Quoted in Halmi (2012) 354.

<sup>53</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> Schelling (2007) 136. Also quoted at Whistler (2015) 12. My emphasis.

in other ways. On this view, it is the rain god, not meteorological explanation, that best expresses the nature of a storm.

The question that naturally arises in light of these claims is the question as to what exactly it is that mythology expresses. Schelling's answer to this question is that mythology expresses divine unity or "the One."<sup>55</sup> On this point, it is helpful to note that Schelling's interest in these lectures is to show that there is continuity between mythology and revealed religion. In the Christian context, the notion of the trinity of father, son, and holy spirit is not a mere metaphor for the triplicity of the godhead. Rather, the trinity is taken to be a necessary illustration of the threefold nature of divine unity. Schelling wants to claim this adequate status for mythology as well: on the view he defends in the lectures, a theogonic story like the castration of Cronus is a necessary illustration of divine nature in the same way as the Christian trinity. Mythology and revelation are both adequate symbolic exhibitions of divine unity.<sup>56</sup> In the words of Schelling scholar Markus Gabriel: "Myths are not faulty efforts at expressing a logical truth, they rather enact the very unity of sense and being, of content and form."<sup>57</sup>

In his book, Whistler convincingly argues that this notion of the tautegorical symbol can be generalized to other parts of Schelling's system. Most importantly for my purposes here, he claims that Schelling views certain finite objects, like works of art and organic life forms, as tautegorical symbols of infinite rational form.

My argument in the dissertation is that, in the Hegelian picture, tautegorical symbolization also applies to the logical realm. Specifically, it describes the relationship between the infinite rational form that Hegel calls "the Concept" and the set of finite forms of judgment and inference that describe the determined structure of individual objects and thoughts; that is, forms like the simple predicative judgment "S is P". In the Hegelian picture as I reconstruct it, the synthetic activity of conceptuality in general is symbolically expressed in individual rational

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<sup>55</sup> *ibid.* 137.

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.* 123-39.

<sup>57</sup> Gabriel (2009) 62. Also quoted at Whistler (2015) 13.

acts. These individual rational acts are adequate symbols of the Concept. In this way, the determined individual (mental or physical) is identical to the rational universal in the way that the tautegorical symbol is identical with its referent: it is the same thing, put differently.<sup>58</sup>

I have been emphasizing the Schellingian heritage of this idea but characterizing Hegelian logic as “tautegorical” also brings Hegel into contact with the foundations of contemporary analytic philosophy of logic. In that tradition, Wittgenstein is famous for having claimed that the laws of logic are tautological.<sup>59</sup> He explains this claim by appeal to a distinction between logical propositions, which can be seen to be true simply from the way they are written, and non-logical propositions, which require additional information in order for their truth or falsity to be ascertained:

It is the characteristic mark of logical propositions that one can perceive in the symbol [i.e. in the notation, E.L.] alone that they are true; and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic. And so also it is one of the most important facts that the truth or falsehood of non-logical propositions cannot be recognized from the propositions alone.<sup>60</sup>

On this view, logical propositions are explicitly analytic statements that require no heterogeneous material in order for their truth to be demonstrated.

As is well known, one of Kant’s explicit goals in the first *Critique* is to show that there is a certain kind of object-involving a priori logic that is comprised of synthetic a priori judgments. Kant accomplishes this by means of his doctrine of sensibility. By arguing that there are a set of

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<sup>58</sup> My claim that Hegel’s thought contains a robust theory of symbolic form that serves as a successor concept to the Kantian schematism is similar to Ernst Cassirer’s account of a symbolic successor to the Kantian schematism in his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (1923-9). My reading of Hegel departs from Cassirer, however, by proposing that forms of judgment and inference are symbolic in this way.

<sup>59</sup> Wittgenstein (2010) 6.1, 77. On this claim cf. Durben and Floyd (1991).

<sup>60</sup> *ibid.* 6.113, 77.

a priori forms of sensibility that serve to provide a priori intuitive content for certain concepts, he defends the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments.

In his own logic, Hegel wants to do Kant one better. As we have seen, Hegel wants to preserve the synthetic, object-involving character of Kant's transcendental logic while rejecting the Kantian claim that there is a distinct set of a priori sensible forms. Further, on my reading, Hegel *also* anticipates the Wittgensteinian claim that the propositions of logic are self-identical and, as such, require no additional heterogeneous material in order for their truth to be demonstrated. In order to hold these two apparently contradictory positions simultaneously, Hegel argues that logic exhibits its correspondence with itself by being comprised of two apparently distinct but ultimately identical aspects—conceptual unity, on the one hand, and the discursive forms of judgment, on the other—that refer to one another symbolically.

The self-referring symbolic character of Hegelian logic is what I describe by means of the term tautegory. Hegelian logic is tautegorical rather than tautological and this is the way in which Hegelian logic is synthetically self-identical.

#### **4. Outline**

The dissertation is comprised of five chapters. In Chapter 1, I take up Hegel's critique of Kant's theory of intuition as it is presented in an important early essay entitled "Faith and Knowledge" (1802). I follow Longuenesse and Sedgwick in emphasizing the importance of the critique of Kant provided in this essay to understanding Hegel's mature critique of Kant, and especially his critique of Kantian intuition. I go on to outline a novel interpretation of the positive alternative to Kant that Hegel proposes in this essay. Specifically, I demonstrate that Hegel finds resources in Kant's discussion of symbolic intuition in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment for offering a different understanding of the relationship between thought and reality to Kant without reverting to a pre-Kantian rationalist metaphysics. I argue that the lynchpin of Hegel's view is his

rejection of the idea of intuitions as representations [*Vorstellungen*] in favor of the idea of intuitions as exhibitions [*Darstellungen*].

In Chapter 2, I expand on this account by looking at Hegel's rejection of Friedrich Schelling's theory of intellectual intuition. This chapter fills a pressing gap in the literature. I argue that Hegel and Schelling share a commitment to offering an account of sensibility that is centered on the way in which individual sensible objects exhibit the existence of supersensible universals. This is where the notion of tautegorical symbolization becomes relevant: following Whistler, I show how Schelling employs this symbolic structure to account for the way in which individual sensible objects exhibit the existence of supersensible universals. For Schelling, works of fine art are paradigmatic sense objects of this kind. I claim that, contra Schelling, Hegel believes that logic itself should also perform this function.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I turn to Hegel's positive account of the way in which the forms belonging to logic exhibit the way in which universals appear to the senses in individual objects. Against recent interpretations that have sought to understand Hegel's logic as offering only a "theory of explanation" I show that Hegel's logic also offers a "theory of exhibition": that is, a theory of the way in which sensible individuals exhibit the existence of universals. In order to show how this works, I focus on the relationship between the Hegelian Concept and the forms of judgment that is laid out in the "Subjectivity" section of the *Science of Logic*. I argue that, here, Hegel shows that the synthetic activity of individual logical forms (i.e. specific forms of judgment and inference) are symbolic exhibitions of the universal logical form (i.e. the Concept).

Finally, Chapter 5 takes this reading from the abstract context of the *Logic* into the concrete realms of nature and spirit, the topics of the other two volumes of Hegel's tripartite Encyclopedia project. I discuss the fate of Kant's forms of intuition, space and time, as the opening moments of Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature*. I then offer a reading of the account of empirical cognition in the *Philosophy of Spirit* that focuses on reconciling Hegel's apparent

coherentism about conceptual knowledge with his claim that sensory representations still have a role to play in his epistemology.

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